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I.

INTRODUCTION

As the effects of the financial crisis continue to unravel before us, it is
ever more apparent how interlinked our economies are throughout the
world, and regulators have become increasingly concerned regarding
corruption that is international in scope. Huge amounts of money are being
shifted and transferred every day, often through multiple borders and
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jurisdictions. Regulatory authorities are realizing that they must cross their
borders to pursue enforcement actions; the ―post-financial crisis‖
jurisdiction is the globe. And in particular, securities enforcement trends
post-financial crisis show that regulatory authorities worldwide have
almost universally agreed to coordinate and cooperate with each other as
they pursue enforcement actions. The financial crisis has brought to the
forefront various regulators that are speaking out for greater cross-border
cooperation and a more robust, collaborative oversight of the world‘s
financial system. Time will tell where that leads.
Regulators, in part shocked into action by the global nature of the
financial crisis, have recently started to make increased efforts to combat
corruption and bribery at a global level. Authorities in the United States
and throughout the world have almost universally articulated a need for
heightened international cooperation in the last few years. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖), the United States Treasury, and the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (―OECD‖),
among others, have set the tone for new principles. With the goal of more
effective supervision of global markets, they are pursuing a common
agenda. For example, regulators and other authorities or organizations
have realized that the ―economies struggled to recover from a global
economic and financial crisis that was closely linked to questions of
honesty, propriety and transparency in business conduct.‖1 Chairman of
the SEC, Mary Schapiro, testifying before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 2009, explained that the financial
crisis has demonstrated how ―traditional processes evolved into
questionable business practices, that, when combined with leverage and
global markets, created extensive systemic risk.‖2 She then articulated a
need for ―active enforcement that serves as a ready reminder‖ of the rules
and ―why we need [the rules] to protect consumers, investors, and
taxpayers—and . . . the system itself.‖3 Also in 2009, SEC Commissioner
Luis Aguilar said, ―As the recent financial crisis has demonstrated,
misconduct can have a global effect. As a result, international cooperation
in combating fraud is more crucial than ever before.‖4 Similarly, SEC
Commissioner Kathleen Casey stated that the financial crisis has ―shaken
1. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Working Group on Bribery (―OECD Working
Group‖), 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2010) [hereinafter OECD Working Group, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/45460981.pdf.
2. Establishing a Framework for Systematic Risk Regulation: Hearing before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts072309mls.htm.
3. Id.
4. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm‘r, SEC, Speech at the Third Annual Fraud and Forensic
Accounting Education Conference: Combating Securities Fraud at Home and Abroad (May
28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052809laa.htm.
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the foundations of our markets, and acutely demonstrated their truly
interdependent and connected nature . . . trigger[ing] a fundamental
rethinking of the adequacy of regulatory supervision at both the national
and international levels.‖5 At the United States Department of Treasury,
Under Secretary Lael Brainard remarked in 2010: ―America . . . cannot act
alone. Other nations must also undertake the difficult reforms required to
rebalance global growth as well as to strengthen their own economies.‖6
Although regulators have recognized the need to engage in international
cooperation to combat corruption and bribery at a global level, it remains to
be seen if this understanding will lead to a meaningful transformation in the
area of enforcement.
II.

RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CROSS-BORDER
ENFORCEMENT

A.

Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development

In response to the financial crisis, international and national bodies
have placed the issues surrounding global corruption near the top of their
agendas. Through its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, the OECD, for example,
attempts to reign in corruption in global business practices with standards
criminalizing bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions.7 On June 15, 2010, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in
International Business Transactions (―OECD Working Group‖) released an
Annual Report indicating the progress made by its thirty-eight signatories
(including thirty-three OECD members and five other countries) in the past
year.8 Twenty-one parties to the Convention reported 280 ongoing
investigations, with 150 of the investigations being conducted in one
5. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm‘r, SEC, Welcoming Remarks Before the 34th IOSCO
Annual Conference (June 10, 2009), http://www.oceg.org/blog/welcoming-remarks-34thiosco-annual-conference.
6. Press Release, Lael Brainard, Under Sec‘y, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, Rebuilding
Together: Europe and the United States after the Global Financial Crisis (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/us-official-us-europe-rebuilding-after-financial-crisis.
7. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (―OECD‖), Convention on Combating Bribery
of
Foreign
Public
Officials
in
International
Transactions
(2011),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf; see also OECD, Country Reports on the
Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (Mar. 25, 2011, 2:27 PM),
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,3n_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html
(providing country-by-country reports on the implementation of the convention).
8. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1; see also David A.
Wilson, Leveling the Anti-Corruption Playing Field, LAW360 (July 19, 2010), available at
http://www.law360.com/web/articles/180065 (discussing OECD‘s progress in combating
bribery).

KLEHM, MCKOWN & POSNERFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE)

930

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/26/2011 10:53 AM

[Vol. 13:4

country.9 The Annual Report also highlights the challenges of changing the
international business culture, where bribery is a common element and
some governments are reluctant to enforce anti-bribery policies.10
In November 2009, the OECD Working Group issued the AntiBribery Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (―OECD Anti-Bribery
Recommendation‖).11 It encourages signatories to cooperate with other
countries to prosecute allegations of bribery, strengthen their whistleblower
protections, and review policies on small facilitation payments, among
other things. The OECD also issued guidance called ―Good Practice
Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance‖ (―OECD Good
Practice Guidance‖), adopted on February 18, 2010.12 The OECD Good
Practice Guidance asks the private sector to adopt clear anti-bribery
policies, assume responsibility for the oversight of ethics and compliance
programs, conduct regular training and communication programs on
foreign bribery with employees and business partners, and implement
disciplinary procedures for violations of anti-bribery rules.13 It also
includes considerable emphasis on third-party compliance measures, such
as a recommendation that companies institute measures to prevent foreign
bribery with third parties such as agents and other intermediaries,
consultants, representatives, distributors, contractors and suppliers,
consortia, and joint venture partners.14 The OECD Working Group has
implemented a peer review process to assess a signatory‘s implementation
of the recommendations described above.15 The review process is intended
to measure a country‘s enforcement and institutional mechanisms and
review its legislation. The OECD Good Practice Guidance is not legally
binding; however, like the DOJ Sentencing Guidelines, it presents
incentives and methodologies for adopting strong compliance programs,16
and sets forth a global standard.
The OECD Working Group has grown since the financial crisis. In
2009, Russia asked to join the Anti-Bribery Convention as part of the
OECD membership drive.17 The OECD Working Group is also deepening
9. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. OECD Working Group in Int‘l Bus. Transactions, Recommendation of the Council
for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf.
12. OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance
(Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/51/44884389.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10–11.
16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4 cmt. background (2010).
17. OECD Working Group, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
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relations on anti-bribery issues with China, India, Indonesia and Thailand
through the exchange of information and official missions, and it aims to
eventually offer memberships to these countries.18 In December 2009, the
OECD Working Group launched a new three-year Initiative to Raise
Global Awareness of Foreign Bribery.19 The three-year initiative includes
plans for a global media outreach campaign, a ―Foreign Bribery Impact
Study‖ of the harm caused by bribery, and the development of academic
courses on foreign bribery for law and business schools.20 Also in 2009,
the OECD Working Group strengthened its anti-corruption ties with the
World Bank regarding the quantification of the proceeds of bribery and
asset recovery.21
On October 15, 2010, after conducting a review, the OECD Working
Group commended United States regulators on their enforcement efforts.22
OECD findings were summarized, in part, as follows:
U.S. enforcement has increased steadily and resulted in
increasingly significant prison sentences, monetary penalties and
disgorgement. Increased enforcement was enabled by the good
practices developed within the U.S. legal and policy framework,
including the dedication of resources to specialized units in the
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Securities and Exchange Commission. New legislation has
also strengthened accounting and auditing standards, including
those introduced in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
whistleblower protections under the July 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.23
Most recently, the OECD Working Group issued reports regarding
anti-corruption measures in Iceland and the Ukraine.24 It concluded that
18. Id. at 33–36.
19. Id. at 12–13.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 45–46.
22. See OECD Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs, United States: Phase 3 Report
on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised Recommendation on combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions (Oct. 15, 2010) (commenting on the visible
and high level of support for the fight against bribery from the United States),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf.
23. Id. at 4.
24. OECD Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs, Iceland: Phase 3 : Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions (Dec. 15, 2010) [hereinafter OECD,
Iceland:
Phase 3], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/41/46861415.pdf; OECD AntiCorruption Network for Eastern and Central Asia, Second Round of Monitoring: Ukraine
Monitoring Report (Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter OECD ACN, Ukraine Monitoring Report],
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/55/46832397.pdf.
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Iceland must work to ensure its law enforcement authorities are
coordinated and adequately resourced to investigate and prosecute
economic crimes.25 Specifically, it recommended that Iceland should
strengthen sanctions for foreign bribery offenses and ensure that private
sector whistleblowers are adequately protected when reporting suspected
acts of bribery.26 The OECD also concluded that the Ukraine had made
little progress after the financial crisis, despite pledges from the country‘s
leaders to take action.27 It recommended, among other things, that the
Ukraine should ensure effective international mutual legal assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, strengthen the public
institutions responsible for combating corruption, and establish a dedicated
anti-corruption investigative body with specialist prosecutors.28
Strong United States support has accompanied the OECD‘s
burgeoning efforts. During his remarks to the OECD in May 2010 in Paris,
Attorney General Eric Holder expressed concerted and ever-increasing
United States support for the OECD and the Anti-Bribery Convention.29
He said:
For years, the OECD has been at the forefront of efforts to
combat corruption wherever and however it occurs . . . . [N]one
of the progress the United States has made would have been
possible without the long-term cooperation of our law
enforcement partners around the globe—cooperation fostered by
relationships established through the OECD . . . . Every member
of the Working Group, including the United States, can do more
to engage in robust international cooperation.30
Holder pointed out that one reason authorities should cooperate is
because bribery takes a large toll on the economy.31 ―The World Bank
estimates that more than one trillion dollars in bribes are paid each year out
of a world economy of 30 trillion dollars. That‘s a staggering three percent
of the world‘s economy. And the impact is particularly severe on foreign
investment,‖ Holder told the OECD.32 In particular, the impact on
developing countries, such as Bangladesh, where ―foreign bribery imposes
huge costs on [the country] and also taints politics and democratic

25. OECD, Iceland: Phase 3, supra note 24, at 4.
26. Id.
27. OECD ACN, Ukraine Monitoring Report, supra note 24, at 40.
28. Id. at 43–44.
29. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Holder Delivers Remarks at the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (May 31, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100531.html.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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governance,‖ can reportedly be devastating.33
B.

G-20 Working Group on Anti-Corruption

The OECD is not alone in bolstering its anti-bribery efforts and postfinancial crisis recommendations: recently, the G-20 has taken on a
leadership role as a forum to promote international economic cooperation.34
In June 2010, at the G-20 Summit in Toronto, the G-20 announced the
creation of a G-20 Working Group on Anti-Corruption (―WGAC‖) to
examine and make recommendations regarding international cooperation to
combat corruption.35
The G-20 mandated the WGAC to make
recommendations on how the G-20 could continue to make practical and
valuable contributions to international efforts to combat corruption. The G20 now seeks to lead by example in key areas that include, but are not
limited to, adopting and enforcing strong and effective anti-bribery rules,
fighting corruption in the public and private sectors, preventing access of
corrupt persons to global financial systems, cooperating in visa denial,
extradition and asset recovery, and protecting whistleblowers from
retaliation.36
These steps occurred in connection with the G-20‘s earlier directives
to strengthen international standards and promote international cooperation
among national regulators as a necessary outcome in current global
financial markets.37 In November 2008, the G-20 leaders set forth five
principles to guide policy implementation: (1) strengthening transparency
and accountability; (2) enhancing sound regulation; (3) promoting integrity
in financial markets; (4) reinforcing international cooperation; and (5)
reforming international financial institutions.38
WGAC also achieved consensus on the idea of strengthening the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (―UNCAC‖).39 As a result,
the G-20 called on all G-20 members to fully implement the UNCAC. In
September 2010, WGAC met in Jakarta and agreed on an action plan that
33. Transparency Int‘l, 2010 Progress Report: Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention 76 (July 28, 2010), http://www.transparency.org/content/download/53670/
856410/file/2010+PROGRESS+REPORT.pdf.
34. John W. Head, The Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 in Context—Reflections
on International Legal and Institutional Failings, ―Fixes,‖ and Fundamentals, 23 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 43, 56–62 (2010).
35. Press Release, Republic of Indonesia, G-20 Working Group on Anti-Corruption,
Jakarta, 27–28 September 2010 (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/Press
Release.aspx?IDP=1002&l=en [hereinafter Press Release, Republic of Indonesia].
36. Id.
37. G-20, Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov.
15, 2008), http://www.g20.org/documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf.
38. Id at 3.
39. Press Release, Republic of Indonesia, supra note 35.
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the G-20 leaders later endorsed at the G-20 Summit in Seoul, South Korea
in November 2010.40 As WGAC developed the action plan, WGAC
members bridged differences and reached consensus on its elements, such
as (1) adopting and enforcing legal and other measures against international
bribery; and (2) preventing corrupt officials from laundering their proceeds
of corruption and accessing the global financial system.41
The G-20 is encouraging all major economies to adopt the standards
set forth in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Lastly, the leaders of the
G-20 and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(―IOSCO‖) established the Financial Stability Board (―FSB‖) to monitor
the progress of ―needed reforms.‖42 In a world without a global financial
regulator, the FSB was mandated in April 2009 to serve as ―a mechanism
for national authorities, standard setting bodies . . . and international
financial institutions to address vulnerabilities and to develop and
implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest
of financial stability.‖43 In March 2010, the FSB launched an initiative to
incentivize jurisdictions to engage in international cooperation and adhere
to information exchange standards in the financial regulatory and
supervisory area.44 The FSB is set to play an integral role in developing a
framework for international cooperation throughout the global financial
system.45
C.

International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)

Aside from its creation of the FSB with the G-20, IOSCO is also
building a regulatory framework to combat cross-border market abuse. On
January 22, 2010, IOSCO announced that it achieved its 2005 goal of
having its eligible membership sign onto, or commit to signing, the IOSCO
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding concerning Consultation,
Cooperation, and the Exchange of Information (―MMoU‖).46 This
achievement means that 96% of IOSCO‘s eligible membership of 115
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Financial Stability Board, Progress since the St. Andrews Meeting in Implementing
the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability 4 (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100419.pdf.
43. Press Release, Financial Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Re-established
as the Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press
/pr_090402b.pdf.
44. Financial Stability Board, supra note 42, at 11.
45. G-20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, ¶ 15 (Apr. 2 2009),
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf.
46. Media Release, Int‘l Org. of Sec. Comm‘ns (―IOSCO‖), IOSCO Completes Global
Framework to Fight Against Cross-Border Market Abuse (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS176.pdf.
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securities regulators now meet the requirements needed to become a
signatory of the MMoU, or have made the necessary commitment to seek
national legislative changes in order to become eligible in the near future.47
The MMoU provides a mechanism through which securities regulators can
share essential investigative material while also setting out specific
requirements for the exchange of information. The sixty-four full MMoU
signatories can request and share confidential information in pursuit of
cross-border securities offenses. In 2009, IOSCO saw 1261 information
requests made by its members to fellow regulators via the MMoU, an
increase from 867 in 2008, a figure that was itself an increase of eighteen
percent from 2006.48 Jane Diplock, Chairman of the IOSCO Executive
Committee, said at the 2010 Global Financial Crisis Conference: ―The new
post-crisis global financial architecture may still be under construction, but
promising characteristics are already emerging. Standards are likely to be
more convergent, and greater enforcement cooperation across jurisdictions
will leave transgressors with fewer places to hide.‖49
D.

Financial Action Task Force

The Financial Action Task Force (―FATF‖), an inter-governmental
body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and
international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing
through legislative and regulatory reforms, also responded to the financial
crisis.50 The FATF examined the impact of the crisis on anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist financing efforts and reported on the results of
its study to the G-20 Ministers of Finance in August 2009. At the G-20
leaders‘ request, the FATF then publicly identified twenty-eight high-risk
and non-cooperating jurisdictions in February 2010.51 A few months later,
twenty of these jurisdictions had already provided written high-level
commitments to address the deficiencies identified.52

47. Id. at 1.
48. Id. at 2–3.
49. Jane Diplock, Chairman, IOSCO Exec. Comm., Speech at the Global Financial
Crisis Conference at Bond University, Sydney, Australia: The Work of IOSCO and the
Financial Regulatory Framework (Apr. 9, 2010) (on file with author).
50. Financial Action Task Force (―FATF‖), Annual Report 2009–2010 (2010),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/50/53/45712700.pdf; see also Paul Vlaanderen, President,
FATF, Speech to the Association of Banks in Singapore: Global Threats and Challenges for
Financial Institutions (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/5/0,3746,en_
32250379_32236879_44902085_1_1_1_1,00.html.
51. FATF Annual Report, supra note 50, at 28–29.
52. Id.
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The Dodd-Frank Act

The financial crisis also triggered ambitious legislative reform by the
United States Congress, culminating in the historic Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the ―Dodd-Frank Act‖) being signed
into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.53 Many elements of the
Dodd-Frank Act attain synergy with the efforts of the G-20 leaders, Basel
and the FSB, and indicate an intensified acceleration of information
sharing.54 In order to combat fraud, the Dodd-Frank Act includes a
whistleblower program that provides monetary rewards to employees who
report securities violations, such as illegal payments to foreign officials.55
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act appends the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 with a new provision, Section 21F: if someone provides the SEC
with ―original information‖ regarding any violation of securities laws
resulting in monetary sanctions over $1 million, the SEC has the discretion
to award the whistleblower ten to thirty percent of the monetary payment
collected.56 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers could potentially
receive very large cash rewards, especially when settlements reach the
billion-dollar range. On May 25, 2011, the SEC adopted final rules related
to implementing the whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
scheduled to go into effect on August 12, 2011.57 One anticipated result of
the new whistleblower program may be an increase in the number of
investigations and prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(the ―FCPA‖), which at the same time raises concerns that corporate
employees may be tempted to forego their own internal compliance
programs.58
The Dodd-Frank Act‘s whistleblower program also contemplates
international cooperation among regulatory authorities. The whistleblower
provisions authorize the disclosure of information that could reasonably be
expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower to foreign securities and
law enforcement authorities subject to appropriate assurances of
53. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter ―Dodd-Frank Act‖].
54. Continuing Oversight on International Cooperation to Modernize Financial
Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & Int‘l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 45 (2010) (statement of Daniel K.
Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
55. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at 1843–49.
56. Id. at § 922.
57. See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545 (May 25,
2011), available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf.
58. T. Markus Funk, Meeting (and Exceeding) Our Obligations: Will OECD‘s AntiBribery Convention Cause the Dodd-Frank Act‘s ‗Whistleblower Bounty‘ Incentives to Go
Global?, 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT 711 (Oct. 8, 2010).
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confidentiality as determined by the SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act also
establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (―FSOC‖) to identify
risks to financial stability, promote market discipline, and respond to any
emerging threats in the system.59 In light of the Dodd-Frank Act‘s impact
on foreign entities that do business with the United States, SEC Chairman
Schapiro, while testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking
regarding the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, said the SEC Office
of International Affairs was ―consulting bilaterally and through multilateral
organizations with counterparts abroad, and is meeting bi-weekly with . . .
[the] rule writing staff [at the SEC] to ensure appropriate coordination with
our foreign counterparts.‖60
F.

The Volcker Rule

New U.S. banking regulations after the financial crisis will also test
the extent of international cooperation. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act adopted the ―Volcker
Rule‖ as new Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act.61 As
proposed by Paul Volcker, former Federal Reserve Chairman who served
as Chairman of the President‘s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, the
Volcker Rule is ―particularly designed to deal with the problem of ‗too big
to fail‘ and the related moral hazard that looms so large as an aftermath of
the emergency rescues of financial institutions, bank and non-bank, in the
midst of crises.‖62 The Volcker Rule aims to achieve its objective by
prohibiting any banking entity from engaging in proprietary trading or
acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest
in or controlling relationship over, or sponsorship of a hedge fund or a

59. Financial Stability Oversight Counsel, Financial Stability Oversight Council
Created Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
Documents/FAQ%20-%20FinancialStabilityOversightCouncilOctober2010FINALv2.pdf;
see also Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, Financial Stability Council Holds Inaugural
Meeting
(Oct.
1,
2010),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg888.aspx.
60. Testimony on Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts093010mls.htm.
61. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at 1620.
62. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding
Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th
Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Prohibiting High-Risk Investment Activities] (statement of Paul
Volcker, Chairman of President‘s Economic Recovery Advisory Board), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=ec787c5
6-dbd2-4498-bbbd-ddd23b58c1c4.
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private equity fund.63 Aside from the above prohibitions, the Volcker Rule
also places restrictions on other activities by banking entities, such as
relationships with private equity funds and hedge funds.64
In 2011, the Volcker Rule continues to move toward implementation.
On January 18, the FSOC released its report about the Volcker Rule
entitled ―Study & Recommendation on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading
& Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds & Private Equity Funds.‖65 The
study responds to the mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act requiring the FSOC
to study and make recommendations for the implementation of the DoddFrank Act within six months after the Act is enacted.66 In the study, the
FSOC acknowledges the concerns of the financial industry regarding the
vague areas of the Volcker Rule, particularly the blurry line between
permitted and prohibited activities.67 While the Volcker Rule prohibits
banking entities from proprietary trading and investment or sponsorship in
hedge funds and private equity funds, it also provides several exceptions to
the prohibition.68 The FSOC study notably recommends that banking
entities implement robust compliance programs, including the CEO‘s
public attestation of the regime‘s effectiveness.69 The FSOC also
acknowledges concerns that the Volcker Rule places U.S. banks at a
competitive disadvantage, but does not actually address those concerns.70
Meanwhile, the architect of the Volcker Rule is no longer a part of the
administration, which appears to be seeking closer ties with the business
sector.71 On January 21, 2011, President Obama named Jeffrey R. Immelt
as Paul Volcker‘s successor as the leader of the President‘s outside panel of
economic advisers.72 The panel has been reconfigured from the Economic
Recovery Advisory Board into the new Council on Jobs and
Competitiveness, whose creation reflects the shift of the administration‘s

63. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (―FSOC‖), STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS &
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS (2011) [hereinafter FSOC REPORT].
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id.
66. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at § 619.
67. FSOC REPORT, supra note 63.
68. Id. at 1. The Volcker Rule allows banks to conduct certain trading activities as
market makers, underwriters, and hedging activities. The Volcker Rule also allows de
minimis investment in hedge funds and private equity funds and provides exemptions to the
prohibition when the banks provide fund investment services to their customers. Id. at 56.
The precise meaning of ―customer‖ has yet to be defined.
69. Id. at 69.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Anahad O‘Connor, Obama Picks G.E. Chief for Board as
Focus
Turns
to
Jobs,
N.Y. TIMES,
Jan.
21,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/economy/22immelt.html.
72. Id.
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economic focus from crisis aversion to job creation.73
Although the implementation of the Volcker Rule will depend on the
rulemaking of other federal agencies, it has already led to changes or plans
to change at major banks.74 For example, the chief of proprietary trading at
Morgan Stanley resigned along with sixty employees.75 He pledged to
form a new firm with his team of traders by the end of 2012.76 And as
other countries are unlikely to implement the provisions of the Volcker
Rule, investment firms such as JPMorgan have commented that European
investment banks may gain ―material positive earnings potential‖ as a
result of its implementation.77 It is no surprise that the Volcker Rule faces
fierce opposition from banks and Wall Street firms. However, according to
Paul Volcker, the Volcker Rule presents another opportunity for
international cooperation. In his statement before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Paul Volcker said:
[A] strong international consensus on the proposed approach
would be appropriate, particularly across those few nations
hosting large multi-national banks and active financial markets.
The needed consensus remains to be tested. However, judging
from what we know and read about the attitude of a number of
responsible officials and commentators, I believe there are
substantial grounds to anticipate success as the approach is fully
understood.78
Without this international cooperation among regulators, the Volcker
Rule could harm United States banks and other firms.
Despite the long list of recommendations and the FSOC‘s full support
for the ―robust implementation‖ of the Volcker Rule, the new FSOC study
does little to further the implementation of the rule. Press reports have
noted that the study is being criticized as largely ―open-ended‖ and too
deferential to regulators with regard to key decisions.79 The task of
implementing the Volcker Rule has been delegated to the federal agencies
responsible for designing the rules, which ―have nine months to implement

73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Morgan Stanley Team to Exit in Fallout From Volcker
Rule, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2011, at C1 (discussing the responses to the Volcker Rule at
major banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Elisa Martinuzzi, Volcker Rule Favors European Investment Banks, JPMorgan
Says, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 12, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-12/volckerrule-favors-european-investment-banks-jpmorgan-says.html.
78. Prohibiting High Risk Investments, supra note 62, at 3.
79. Victoria McGrane & Aaron Lucchetti, Oversight Plan Seen to Lack Specifics,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011.

KLEHM, MCKOWN & POSNERFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE)

940

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/26/2011 10:53 AM

[Vol. 13:4

detailed regulations for the institutions they oversee.‖80 It is still hard to
say how effective the Volcker Rule will be and how it will complement
trends toward international cooperation among enforcement authorities.
G.

Securities and Exchange Commission

As expected, the SEC also features prominently in the view toward
cooperation in cross-border securities enforcement. In November 2008, the
then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said, ―As the credit crisis has
unfolded throughout the world during 2008, the SEC has been working
closely with our international . . . counterparts . . . to coordinate our actions
and align our strategies. Nowhere was this more important than in the area
of enforcement.‖81 Cox reported that as of November 2008, the SEC made
556 requests to foreign regulators for assistance in SEC investigations over
the year, ―more than one [request] a day on average.‖82 He added that
many of the investigations related to possible wrongdoing in the subprime
mortgage area. Reciprocally, the SEC received 454 requests from foreign
regulators for cooperative law enforcement help in the past year.83
Enforcement in the FCPA area took off for the SEC after 2006, likely as a
result of the CEO certification required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act84 and
increasing globalization.85 The SEC brought more cases in the last five
years than in the twenty-eight years prior to 2005, when the FCPA was
enacted.86 At the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practice
Act in November 2010, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer
proclaimed that the ―FCPA enforcement is stronger than it‘s ever been—
and getting stronger.‖87 The United States Congress has reportedly
appropriated substantial additional resources in the billions of dollars to the

80. Id.
81. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the SEC Int‘l Enforcement Institute:
The Importance of International Enforcement Cooperation in Today‘s Markets (Nov. 7,
2008).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806
(requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify periodic financial reports).
85. Since the DOJ created the FCPA unit in 2006, the government has ―collected
billions of dollars in civil and criminal penalties‖ by prosecuting more cases since 2006 than
in the first twenty-eight years of the FCPA‘s existence. Funk, supra note 58, at 3.
86. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Response of the United States to Questions
Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working Group on Bribery 13 (May 3, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf.
87. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks
at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html
[hereinafter
Breuer FCPA Conference].
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US Department of Justice and FBI for the pursuit of white-collar crime
since 2009.88 In January 2011, Breuer discussed some of the steps taken by
the DOJ to significantly increase its FCPA enforcement capabilities.89 For
example, in the FCPA Unit, the DOJ promoted a new head of the unit and
two assistant chiefs.90 Additionally, Breuer said the DOJ increased the
number of prosecutors in the FCPA unit, ―attracting high caliber attorneys
with extensive experience—including Assistant U.S. Attorneys with
significant trial and prosecutorial experience and attorneys from private
practice with defense-side knowledge and experience.‖91 The SEC has
similarly been provided with additional resources, including the 2010
creation of a division dedicated to FCPA enforcement.92 In her remarks at
a news conference in January 2011, Cheryl Scarboro, Chief of the SEC‘s
new FCPA Unit, vigorously expressed the Enforcement Division‘s
commitment to work with regulatory authorities around the world ―to level
the playing field worldwide.‖93 She said:
[T]he FCPA Unit will raise the Commission‘s profile on the
global stage by playing a more active role in international
regulatory working groups and building closer relationships with
our regulatory counterparts in other countries. Aggressive
enforcement of the FCPA is essential in a world of increasing
interdependence . . . . The [FCPA] Unit will leverage the efforts
of the SEC, the Department of Justice and our foreign
counterparts to level the playing field worldwide. Together we
will send a clear message that wrongdoers will face a strong and
united front around the world.94
Similarly, Breuer has noted that by strong enforcement of the FCPA,
the United States leads by example and demonstrates a strong anticorruption program to our foreign counterparts.95
Referring to the progress in securities enforcement made by the
United States agencies in 2010, Breuer said there has been a substantial
increase in United States cooperation with our foreign counterparts. United
States participation in the OECD review process, for example, has forged
88. Transparency Int‘l, supra note 33, at 65.
89. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att‘y Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep‘t of Justice,
Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the Washington Area Corporate Counsel
Association (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech110126.html.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Transparency Int‘l, supra note 33, at 65.
93. Cheryl Scarboro, Chief of the FCPA Unit, SEC, Remarks at News Conference
Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310newsconf.htm#scarboro.
94. Id.
95. Breuer FCPA Conference, supra note 89.
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closer relationships between United States and foreign enforcement
agencies.96
The SEC has also changed its focus in this area and is seeking
disgorgement, suing individuals and working closely with DOJ and foreign
regulators.97 Moreover, the SEC began entering into enforcement MOUs
with foreign enforcement authorities such as the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission.98 The SEC has recently placed more emphasis
on enhanced MOUs that go beyond its existing agreements or the IOSCO
Multilateral MOU. Now, approximately one third of the SEC‘s insider
trading and market manipulation cases require the Commission to go
abroad for the evidence. The current trajectory continues the trend since
the insider trading scandals of the 1980s toward greater information sharing
between the SEC and its foreign counterparts. Realizing that one needs to
share information to get information, Congress granted the SEC the
authority to obtain and share information on behalf of a foreign government
and to keep information it receives from a foreign government
confidential.99
In January 2011, press reports indicated that the SEC has been
investigating whether several banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms
have run afoul of the FCPA by making improper payments to secure
investments from sovereign wealth funds.100 A placement agent working
with a sovereign wealth fund may be considered a government official and
therefore covered by the FCPA.101
Companies that reportedly received letters of inquiry from the SEC
included Citigroup, The Blackstone Group, Bank of America, and Morgan
Stanley.102 These firms had sought funding from sovereign wealth funds,
raising billions of dollars in capital to strengthen their balance sheets in
recent years.103 The investigation presumably focuses on whether these
96. Id. Breuer explained that the cooperation had yielded results such as the successful
resolution of the BAE Systems PLC case.
97. Id.
98. Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm‘n, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to the Enforcement of
Securities
Laws,
(Aug.
25,
2008),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_mututal_recognition/australia/enhanced_enforcem
ent_mou.pdf.
99. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 53, at 1843–49.
100. Dionne Searcey & Randall Smith, SEC Probes Banks, Buyout Shops Over Dealings
with
Sovereign
Funds,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
14,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704307404576080403625366100.html.
101. Id.
102. Joshua Gallu, SEC Probes Financial Firms on Sovereign Fund Bribes, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 14, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-14/sec-probesfinancial-firms-on-possible-bribes-to-sovereign-wealth-funds.html.
103. Peter Lattman & Michael J. De La Merced, S.E.C. Looking Into Deals With
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entities paid placement agents to win access to the state-owned money,
with benefits like entertainment and travel.104 This would mark the first
time the SEC has applied the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA to the
financial services industry. In light of cross-border regulation and
increased cooperation between the SEC, the DOJ, and law enforcement and
regulatory authorities throughout the world, financial firms need to remain
alert and bolster their FCPA compliance programs because they now face
increased risk of coordinated international enforcement actions.
H.

United Kingdom Bribery Act

In the United Kingdom, the government has recently taken legislative
action to address the problem of corruption in international business
transactions. The United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 (the ―UKBA‖) went
into effect on July 1, 2011.105 The UKBA is much like the FCPA, but it has
both a broader scope and jurisdictional reach.106 It will be relevant to any
organization that does business in the U.K. or with U.K. counterparties.
On March 30, 2011, the United Kingdom‘s Ministry of Justice
(―MoJ‖) published guidance for businesses regarding the proper scope of
adequate procedures and the extent to which it will exercise prosecutorial
discretion under the new legislation.107 The guidance is based on six
principles each commercial organization should have, which are ―intended
to be flexible and outcome focused:‖ (1) proportionate procedures for
preventing bribery; (2) top-level commitment to preventing bribery; (3) a
periodic, informed, and documented risk assessment; (4) due diligence
procedures with a proportionate and risk-based approach; (5)
communication, including training, that is proportionate to the risks faced;
and (6) monitoring and review of procedures designated to prevent
bribery.108
Each principle is followed by commentary and examples.
The UKBA will likely increase the number of prosecutions and
investigations originating in the U.K. and also encourage the U.K. Serious
Fraud Office (―SFO‖) to cooperate in anti-corruption investigations.
Sovereign Funds, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Jan. 13. 2011, 12:08 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/s-e-c-looking-into-deals-with-sovereign-funds.
104. Id.
105. United Kingdom Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23; see also Michael T. Gass & Anita M.
Christy, UK Bribery Act: Corporate Exposure Beyond the FCPA, LAW 360, June 22, 2010,
http://www.law360.com/web/articles/173718.
106. Gass & Christy, supra note 105.
107. United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010—Guidance,
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/making-reviewing-law/bribery-act-2010guidance.pdf.
108. See id. (NOTE: id. is the UKBA guidance document).
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Significantly, the UKBA permits the United Kingdom to bring enforcement
actions against firms and/or conduct outside of the United Kingdom. 109
The UKBA extends jurisdiction to any company with a business
connection to the United Kingdom, regardless of where it is incorporated or
where the offending conduct occurs.110
Unlike the FCPA, the UKBA reaches wholly private transactions and
does not create an exception for facilitation payments. Further, the UKBA
does not take into account local practice and custom in another country,
even if it is necessary or customary to make facilitation payments in order
to do business there.111 The UKBA is narrower than the FCPA in one
respect in that a company with an appropriate compliance program would
have corporate immunity from liability for failure to prevent bribery as
long as it maintains ―adequate procedures‖ to prevent bribery.112
III. RECENT, LARGE JOINT SETTLEMENTS AND INCREASED
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
In light of the increasing rhetoric calling for international cooperation
among regulatory authorities, some settlements have indeed reached into
the billion-dollar range. In December 2008, shortly after the Madoff case
erupted, regulators reached a settlement with Siemens AG (―Siemens‖), a
manufacturer of industrial and consumer products, that exceeded $1 billion
in disgorgement and fines—over $1.6 billion, in fact—the largest amount a
company had ever had to pay to resolve corruption-related charges.113 The
DOJ characterized the Siemens case as ―unprecedented in scale and
geographic reach.‖114 Although it was in part overshadowed by the Madoff
case and received little press attention at the time, the Siemens settlement
marked the beginning of a wave of truly enormous FCPA cases.115

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Civil Action No. 08 CV 02167 (D.D.C) SEC
Litig.
Release.
No.
20829
(Dec.
15,
2008),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm.
114. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined
Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm1105.html.
115. The largest FCPA settlement to date prior to the Siemens case was Baker Hughes
$44 million settlement with the DOJ and SEC in 2007. See, e.g., Peter B. Clark & Jennifer
A. Suprenant, Siemens—Potential Interplay of FCPA Charges and Mandatory Debarment
under the Public Procurement Directive of the European Union, Cadwalader Wickersham
&
Taft,
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/030409ABASiemensPotentialInterplay.pdf.
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Siemens was charged with violating the FCPA‘s anti-bribery, books and
records, and internal controls provisions.116 It had paid thousands of bribes
totaling over $1 billion to foreign officials between 2001 and 2007 in order
to obtain business around the world.117 Among the improper payments
Siemens paid were bribes for opportunities to build metro trains in China,
national identity cards in Argentina, and medical devices in Vietnam and
Russia.118 The investigation also revealed that Siemens‘ managing board
was ineffective in ensuring the company complied with U.S. regulatory and
anti-bribery requirements as well as the constraints imposed by Germany‘s
adoption of the OECD anti-bribery convention.119 The SEC, for example,
concluded that ―the company‘s tone at the top was inconsistent with an
effective FCPA compliance program and created a corporate culture in
which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the
company.‖120
The SEC leveraged the prior investigation of German prosecutors and
conducted a further joint investigation, resulting in a global settlement with
Siemens.121 Together, the SEC, the DOJ, and the Office of the Prosecutor
General in Munich, Germany, reached a coordinated settlement for
monetary relief and other remedies.122 The U.K. Financial Services
Authority and the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission also
cooperated and provided assistance in the investigation.123 The SEC
obtained $350 million in disgorgement penalties for FCPA violations.124
Relatedly, Siemens paid a $450 million criminal fine to the DOJ.125 In
October 2007, Siemens paid a criminal fine of approximately $285 million,
and in December 2008 the company was ordered to pay an additional $569
million criminal fine, both to the Office of the Prosecutor General in
Munich.126 Further, under the terms of Siemens‘ plea agreement with the
DOJ, it had to retain an independent compliance monitor for four years to
oversee the company‘s implementation of a robust compliance report and
to report back on the company‘s progress.127 Notably, ―the DOJ for the
first time . . . approved a non-American compliance monitor‖ to handle this
responsibility—―Dr. Theo Waigel, a German lawyer and the country‘s
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, supra note 113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

KLEHM, MCKOWN & POSNERFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE)

946

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/26/2011 10:53 AM

[Vol. 13:4

former Minister of Finance.‖128 As part of Siemens‘ integrity initiative
following the settlement, it launched a ―multi-project anti-corruption
initiative.‖129 Among other projects, it is partnering with the OECD to
carry out a three-year project to promote business integrity in the Middle
East and North Africa, holding training sessions and public-private
conferences there.130
At a press conference announcing the global settlement, the then
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Friedrich, took the
opportunity to acknowledge the DOJ‘s significant FCPA enforcement in
recent years.131 He noted that ―[f]rom 2001 to 2004, the Department [of
Justice] resolved or charged 17 FCPA cases.‖132 From 2005 to 2008,
however, it had resolved forty-two cases, ―representing an increase of more
than 200 percent within these four years compared to the prior four-year
period.‖133 He added that the ―potentially even more significant‖ aspect of
the Siemens settlement is ―that the United States is not the only player at
the table.‖134 ―We aren‘t the only ones fighting global corruption,‖ he said.
―Other nations are joining us in this effort, and I‘m here to tell you that‘s a
good thing, and something that we will only see more of in the future.‖135
At the same press conference, Linda Chatman Thomsen, then Director of
the Division of Enforcement at the SEC, said about the Siemens settlement:
―This marks the first time that United States and foreign prosecutors have
coordinated their law enforcement efforts as extensively as they have here
today to address violations of the anti-bribery laws. I expect it will not be
the last.‖136
In March 2010, BAE Systems PLC (―BAES‖), a multinational defense
128. See Alexandra Wrage & Anne Richardson, Siemens AG—Violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 48 INT‘L LEGAL MATERIALS 232, 234 (2009) (questioning Mr.
Waigel‘s qualifications as Siemens‘ monitor).
129. Press Release, OECD, Fighting Corruption: OECD Launches Business Integrity
Project
in
Middle
East
and
North
Africa
(Sept.
12,
2010)
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_46664890_1_1_1_1,00.
html [hereinafter OECD, Fighting Corruption]; see also Siemens Integrity Initiative: One
Page
Project
Profiles
Presentation
(Dec.
9,
2010),
available
at
http://www.siemens.com/sustainability/pool/compliance/integrity_
initiative/siemens_integrity_initiative_project_profiles_feb_1_2011.pdf
(profiling
the
projects funded in the first funding round).
130. OECD, Fighting Corruption, supra note 129.
131. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference Announcing
Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Violations (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-opa1112.html.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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contractor with headquarters in the United Kingdom and with a U.S.
subsidiary—BAE Systems Inc.—pleaded guilty to corruption-related
offenses and agreed to pay $400 million in criminal fines to resolve its
case, ―one of the largest criminal fines ever levied in the United States
against a company for business related violations.‖137 BAES was charged
with committing several FCPA violations.
At the outset, BAES
represented to various government agencies, including the DOJ, that it was
complying with the FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions, as well as similar,
foreign laws relating to the OECD Convention.138 In fact, BAES took steps
to conceal from the U.S. government a series of payments it had made to
third party intermediaries and shell companies, according to court
documents.139 These payments ―were not subjected to the degree of
scrutiny . . . to which BAES told the . . . government [they] would be
subjected.‖140 Additionally, beginning in the mid-1980s, BAES served as
the prime contractor to the U.K. government after the conclusion of a
formal understanding between the U.K. and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(―KSA‖).141 Under the formal understanding and related documents, BAES
sold aircraft, military hardware, training, and services to the U.K.
government, which then sold them to KSA.142 As such, ―BAES provid[ed]
substantial benefits to a foreign public official of KSA, who was in a
position of influence regarding sales of fighter jets, other defense materials
and related support services.‖143 In addition to fines, ―as part of its guilty
plea, BAES . . . agreed to maintain a compliance program [that would]
detect and deter [FCPA] violations‖ and other applicable bribery and anticorruption laws.144
BAES also ―agreed to retain an independent
compliance monitor for three years [to review] BAES‘s compliance
program‖ and report back to the company and the DOJ.145
American authorities announced that they benefited greatly from the
backing of the U.K. SFO in carrying out the BAES investigation.146 In a
statement about the settlement, the DOJ expressed its appreciation for the
SFO‘s assistance, and ―further expresse[d] its gratitude to that office for its

137. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to
Pay
$400
Million
Criminal
Fine
(Mar.
1,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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ongoing partnership in the fight against overseas corruption.‖147 The SFO
also announced a settlement with BAES.148 Unlike the DOJ settlement,
however, which focused on BAES‘s business dealings in multiple
countries, ―the SFO settlement concentrate[d] on the company‘s operations
in Tanzania.‖149 Investigations of BAES reportedly continue in Austria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Switzerland.150
Also in March 2010, the SEC charged Innospec, a specialty chemical
company, with violating the FCPA by engaging in ―widespread bribery of
foreign government officials in Iraq and Indonesia to obtain . . .
business.‖151 Specifically, Innospec paid kickbacks to Iraqi officials to
obtain contracts for the United Nations Oil for Food Program.152 It also
―paid lavish travel and entertainment expenses for Iraqi . . . officials,
including the seven-day honeymoon of one official,‖ ―mobile phone cards
and cameras,‖ and ―thousands . . . in cash for ‗pocket money‘‖ to
officials.153 In Indonesia, Innospec ―paid millions of dollars in bribes
[through an Indonesian agent to continue its chemical sales] to state-owned
refineries and oil companies.‖154 One bribery scheme involved annual
payments to a senior official at BP Migas, the Executive Agency for
Upstream Oil and Gas Activity in the Republic of Indonesia.155 Another
scheme involved the payment of ―special commissions‖ into a Swiss
account, and a third scheme involved a ―one off payment‖ of $300,000.156
Innospec agreed to a $40.2 million global settlement with the SEC,
DOJ, the U.K.‘s SFO, and the U.S. Treasury Department‘s Office of
Foreign Assets Control.157
The SEC again cooperated with and
acknowledged the assistance of the U.K. SFO in carrying out the
investigation.158
In the U.K., Innospec settled with the government after ―plead[ing]
guilty to bribing employees of Pertamina (an Indonesian state[-]owned
147. Id.
148. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems PLC (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2010/bae-systemsplc.aspx.
149. Id.
150. Transparency Int‘l, supra note 33, at 72.
151. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Innospec for Illegal Bribes to Iraqi and
Indonesian Officials (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-40.htm
[hereinafter SEC, SEC Charges Innospec].
152. Id.
153. SEC v. Innospec, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-00448 08 (D.D.C), SEC Litig.
Release No. 21454 (Mar. 18, 2010).
154. SEC, SEC Charges Innospec, supra note 151.
155. SEC v. Innospec, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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refinery) and other [Indonesian] [g]overnment [o]fficials‖ in order to secure
chemical sales agreements there.159 The court approved a $12.7 million
financial penalty on Innospec.160 Following the publication of a 2005
report regarding the United Nations Oil for Food Program, the DOJ started
to investigate Innospec for both sanctions and corruption offenses.161 In
October 2007, the DOJ referred the investigation to the U.K. SFO.162 The
SFO formally accepted the case for investigation in May 2008, after which
the company ―disclosed to the SFO evidence that [it] had sought to
influence [the decisions of Indonesian government officials in public
contracts]‖ for the purchase of chemicals in Indonesia between 1999 and
2006.163 Notably, this case marked the first time the SFO and DOJ agreed
to the appointment of a joint monitor to investigate the company‘s FCPA
compliance program, agreeing that the joint monitor must be acceptable to
both of them.164
A few months after the Innospec settlement, it became apparent that
FCPA settlements were continuing to venture into the $1 billion range. In
July 2010, the SEC settled with Technip SA, Snamprogetti Netherlands
BV, KBR, and JGC Corporation, the corporations behind the four-company
joint venture TSKJ, in a matter where agents of the firms paid bribes to
Nigerian government officials and corporations over a ten-year period in
order to win construction contracts worth more than $6 billion.165
Allegedly, ―senior executives at Snamprogetti and the other joint venture
companies . . . [hired] two agents, a U.K. solicitor and a Japanese trading
company,‖ who funneled more than $180 million in bribes to Nigerian
government officials to obtain these construction contracts.166 Preceding
the award of the contracts, the companies met with top-level executive
branch officials in the Nigerian government to ask for the designation of a
representative with whom the joint venture could confer regarding bribes to
government officials.167 The SEC also alleged that the U.K. solicitor hired
159. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Innospec Limited Prosecuted for Corruption
by the SFO (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/pressreleases-2010/innospec-limited-prosecuted-for-corruption-by-the-sfo.aspx.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. SEC v. ENI, S.p.A. & Snamprogetti Netherlands, B.V, SEC Litig. Release No.
21588. (July 7, 2010) http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21588.htm (stating
that ―ENI and Snamprogetti are the latest to be charged in the decade-long Nigerian bribery
scheme conducted by a joint venture of companies that also included Technip and KBR Inc.
. . . . The $365 million to be paid by ENI and Snamprogetti brings the total sanctions against
the companies involved in the scheme to be more than $1.28 billion . . . .‖).
166. Id.
167. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves Foreign
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a subcontractor in Nigeria to transfer millions of dollars to a Nigerian
government official to benefit a political party in Nigeria.168 The
subcontractor carried the U.S. cash in briefcases and personally delivered it
to the Nigerian government official.169 Some bribes were paid in local
Nigerian currency as well. The fines and penalties in the settlement
exceeded $1.28 billion, with ―Technip, KBR, and its former parent
Halliburton Company pay[ing] . . . $917 million to settle FCPA charges.‖170
After the settlement, the SEC acknowledged the assistance of foreign
authorities in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas, in addition to the FBI
and the Fraud Section of the DOJ‘s Criminal Division.171 The DOJ
acknowledged the ―significant assistance‖ provided by authorities in
France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.172
Nigeria
subsequently brought its own charges against Halliburton.173 In December
2010, the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission reached a
$32.5 million settlement with Halliburton regarding related conduct.174
Regarding the settlement, the FBI Assistant Director involved in the matter
said, ―We will continue to investigate FCPA matters by working in
partnership with other law enforcement agencies, both foreign and
domestic, to ensure that both corporations and executives who bribe foreign
officials in return for lucrative business contracts are punished.‖175 This
settlement further exemplified the trend toward increased international
partnerships among regulatory authorities.
In November 2010, the global logistics services firm Panalpina World
Transport Holding Ltd. (―Panalpina‖), and several of its clients in the oil
and gas service industry (including Shell, Transocean, GlobalSantaFe,
Tidewater, Pride, and Noble) agreed to resolve investigations of overseas
bribery under the joint efforts of the DOJ and SEC.176 Specifically,
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (July
7,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-crm-780.html
[hereinafter
Snamprogetti Press Release].
168. SEC v. ENI, supra note 165.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Snamprogetti Press Release, supra note 167.
173. Ryan Dezember & Tess Styne, Halliburton To Pay Nigeria $35 Million To Settle
Bribery Case, WALL ST. J. Dec. 22, 2010, at B4, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703581204576033663462863014.html.
174. Id. (stating that the $35 million settlement included $2.5 million for the Nigerian
government‘s legal fees).
175. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-751.html.
176. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding
Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More than $156
million
in
Criminal
Penalties
(Nov.
4,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/
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Panalpina admitted that it ―engaged in a scheme‖ to bribe ―numerous
foreign officials on behalf of . . . its customers in the oil and gas industry . .
. in order to circumvent local rules and regulations‖ regarding the
importation of goods.177 It paid these bribes in at least seven countries,
including Angola, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia and
Turkmenistan.178 Panalpina‘s customers also admitted that they ―approved
of . . . the payment of [these] bribes on their behalf in Nigeria and [they
had] falsely recorded the bribe payments . . . as legitimate business
expenses in their corporate books [and] records.‖179 The companies agreed
to pay over $156 million in criminal fines and $80 million in civil
disgorgement, interest and penalties for FCPA violations in numerous
countries.180 Notably, settlements with the SEC and DOJ did not mean the
end of the matter for offending companies. The deferred prosecution
agreements with these companies require the companies ―to fully cooperate
with U.S. and foreign authorities in any ongoing investigations‖ of the
companies‘ bribes.181
Additionally, each company is ―required to
implement and adhere to a set of enhanced corporate compliance and
reporting obligations.‖182 The Panalpina settlement is also significant
because it reflects the use of sweeps to find the violations instead of relying
on self-reporting by the companies.183 An SEC official said that the
investigation started ―after detecting widespread corruption in the oil
services industry.‖184 In its statement about the settlements, the SEC said
this settlement with seven companies in the same industry was ―the first
sweep of a particular industrial sector in order to crack down on public
companies and third parties who are paying bribes abroad.‖185 And
interestingly, in the DOJ‘s statement regarding the settlement, it recognized
the companies‘ willingness to cooperate with the investigations and selfdisclose their conduct:
The corporate resolutions announced today not only hold these
companies accountable for the criminal conduct set forth in these
charging instruments and agreements, but they also reflect the

opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html [hereinafter Oil Services Companies Press
Release].
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding
Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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department giving appropriate and meaningful credit to these
companies to the extent that they have voluntarily self-disclosed
their conduct and commensurate with the quality and extent of
their cooperation.186
Relatedly, since January 2010 when the SEC announced its
Enforcement Cooperation Initiative—―a potential game-changer for the
Division of Enforcement‖—there has been a trend towards encouraging
individuals and companies to assist in investigations.187
In an
announcement about the new initiative, the SEC said it ―establishes
incentives for individuals and companies to fully and truthfully cooperate
and assist with SEC investigations and enforcement actions.‖188 As a
result, it is easier to determine which companies cooperated most with the
regulatory authorities based on the lighter sanctions in their settlements.
The SEC cooperation initiative will likely be used as a way to increase the
number of cases.
Cross-border regulatory cooperation can also be seen in the 2010
announcement by the technology firm Hewlett-Packard that American and
foreign authorities have been probing its deals in several countries,
including Russia and the former Soviet Republic.189 It had previously been
announced that German authorities were investigating matters involving
Hewlett-Packard‘s dealings in Russia and former Soviet Republics.190
Specifically, there were allegations that Hewlett-Packard executives made
bribes to win a contract to sell computer gear, through a German
subsidiary, to the office of the prosecutor general of the Russian
Federation.191 In December 2010, Hewlett-Packard suggested that the
investigation had expanded when it announced that U.S. authorities were
looking at whether Hewlett-Packard employees in Russia, Germany,
Austria, Serbia, or the Netherlands had paid kickbacks to the company‘s
distributors and customers.192
The expansiveness of the regulatory cooperation can be seen in this
matter. At the request of German prosecutors, Russian investigators
obtained a ―large crate of evidence‖ from Hewlett Packard‘s offices there,
186. Oil Services Companies Press Release, supra note 176.
187. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and
Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm.
188. Id.
189. Ben Worthen & David Crawford, H-P Says Probe Has Expanded, WALL ST. J.,
Dec.
17,
2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703395204576023810621129214.html.
190. Hewlett-Packard Co. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 145 (Dec. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter HP Form 10-K].
191. Worthen & Crawford, supra note 189.
192. Id.; see also HP Form 10-K, supra note 190.
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and shared it with German investigators.193 According to press reports,
questions have been raised as to whether senior Hewlett-Packard officials
hired agents to launder money to pay bribes through sham companies.194
Additionally, German prosecutors have shared the evidence related to the
German investigation with the DOJ and SEC.195 As of December 2010,
U.S. officials had traveled to Germany twice in connection with the
investigation.196
Regulators are outspoken in their understanding that the increase in
cooperation between foreign authorities in the post-financial crisis climate
will be crucial to the FCPA‘s continued success. Parallel and cooperative
enforcement actions in other jurisdictions regarding the same conduct at
issue in a United States ―FCPA prosecution is expected to become a new
norm.‖197 Still, American businesses have expressed concerns that the
strong enforcement of the FCPA creates an uneven playing field for them
internationally, particularly in the current difficult economic climate. At a
recent Senate hearing, such concerns were addressed with the United States
enforcement authorities, along with a desire for clearer guidelines on how
companies can comply with the FCPA.198
Cooperation among foreign regulators can be seen outside the FCPA
area in only a few instances. In March 2009, at the request of regulators
investigating an alleged $8 billion fraud, a federal judge in the United
States ―extended a freeze on millions of dollars held in Stanford Group Co.
accounts.‖199 One month later, a judge at the High Court in the U.K. froze
more than $100 million worth of assets belonging to Stanford International
Bank by extending a freezing order covering cash, shares and investments
held in bank accounts at Credit Suisse and HSBC branches in the U.K.200

193. Worthen & Crawford, supra note 189; see also Transparency Int‘l, supra note 33
(discussing German and Russian cooperation in the investigation).
194. Worthen & Crawford, supra note 189.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 416–17 (2009–2010).
198. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010),
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/296805-1.
199. SEC v. Stanford Int‘l Bank, 3:2009-cv-00298 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2009) (order
granting freeze of Stanford assets, also providing for extensions in the future); see also
Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Stanford Judge Extends Freeze on Investor Accounts, BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
2,
2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aE5ab4lw0Hvo (discussing
the asset freeze in connection with the Stanford fraud case).
200. Meghan Murphy, High Court Judge Extends Freeze on Stanford Assets, FIN. TIMES,
Apr.
7,
2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f13ad00-230b-11de-9c9900144feabdc0.html#axzz1URypu9vX.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Trends after the financial crisis show that regulators have almost
universally announced that they intend to further focus their policies and
procedures toward increased international cooperation in the area of
enforcement. Time will tell whether these proclamations will materialize.
One pressing question is to what extent the level of cooperation in FCPA
investigations will take place outside of the FCPA arena. This type of
cooperation has not been witnessed in the fields of insider trading and
market manipulation. Strides have been made in international freeze orders
(notably in the Stanford case) but there remain few examples of this level
of cooperation.
In any event, multinational corporations should continue to stay
attentive to anti-bribery and corruption investigations and inquiries. In the
current climate, with much discussion regarding increased regulation and
scrutiny of corporate business practices, a corporation‘s robust internal
compliance policies and procedures are more vital than ever. With
regulatory authorities speaking out for cooperation with each other in
enforcement investigations, there is a greater likelihood that investigations
will increasingly cross jurisdictional boundaries and result in hefty global
joint settlements among regulators worldwide.

